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Abstract 
At a 644-bed, tertiary-care, “magnet” system, intravenous (IV) infusion medication errors were 
determined to present the greatest risk of harm. An IV infusion safety initiative focused on 
multidisciplinary collaboration, standardization of IV dosing, and medication safety technology. 
A modular IV infusion safety system was determined to provide the greatest “speed to impact” in 
reducing harm. In 9 months, the system averted 166 overdoses; IV Medication Harm Index 
analysis identified 33 as highest risk overdoses (heparin and propofol accounted for 73 percent of 
these highest risk averted overdoses). Although 78 percent of infusion devices were used with 
critical care patient types, 52 percent of the highest risk-averted overdoses occurred with 
noncritical care types. For patient controlled analgesia, respiratory monitoring modules helped 
avert numerous undesired outcomes. Other results included improved best practices, 
communication, nursing satisfaction, retention, and recruitment. From January to June 2006, 
infusion safety systems recorded 328 averted high-risk overdoses. Based on the Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality’s (AHRQ) value of $6,000 per accidental drug overdose, the 
system helped avert 6-month costs of $1,968,000. IV infusion safety systems provide rapid, 
effective, and cost-effective patient safety improvement. 
 
Introduction 
“First, do no harm” is the ethical imperative for every patient safety effort. In working to reduce 
the frequency of medication errors, first priority must be to prevent those errors with the greatest 
potential for harm.
 The leading cause of patient harm is medication errors, which account for 
almost 20 percent of medical injuries.
1 Twenty-eight percent of medication-related injuries 
(adverse drug events, ADEs) are considered preventable.
2 Administration is the stage of the 
medication use process most vulnerable to error,
2 and the intravenous (IV) route of drug 
administration often results in the most serious outcomes of medication errors.
3 IV infusion 
errors, which involve high-risk medications delivered directly into a patient's bloodstream, have 
been identified as having the greatest potential for patient harm.
4, 5, 6, 7, 8 
 
 
1The use of patient controlled analgesia (PCA) for IV opioid infusion presents particular 
challenges, due to the variability of patient response. The Anesthesia Patient Safety Foundation 
(APSF) notes a significant, underappreciated risk of serious injury from PCA in the 
postoperative period, including a low but unpredictable incidence of life-threatening opioid-
induced respiratory depression (RD) in young healthy patients.
9 Even correctly programmed IV 
infusion of therapeutic doses can result in opioid-related respiratory depression (RD). 
Respiratory status changes are a leading indicator of an adverse patient response to opioid 
infusion. Thus, monitoring patient response to PCA therapy is also critical.
10  
 
At St. Joseph’s/Candler Health System (SJCHS), a 644-bed, tertiary-care, “magnet” system, a 
multidisciplinary medication safety team determined in 2001 that reducing the incidence of 
highest risk medication errors—i.e., IV medication administration errors at the point of care, 
particularly those involving continuous drug infusions—would have the greatest, most 
immediate impact on improving medication safety and quality of care. To achieve this goal, 
SJCHS undertook a long-term IV Infusion Safety Initiative. Key elements included a culture of 
safety; a multidisciplinary team comprising physicians, pharmacists, nurses, respiratory 
therapists, risk managers, and others; standardized IV drug nomenclature, concentrations, dosing 
units, and ranges; and implementation of IV medication safety technology.  
 
In working to improve patient safety and quality of care, the goal is to change the system—i.e., 
to make it easier to do the right thing, prevent individuals from committing errors, and build 
high-reliability organizations. To achieve this goal, the use of technology is essential.
7 
Ultimately, computerized prescriber order entry (CPOE), barcode medication administration 
(BCMA), and “smart pumps” (computerized IV infusion safety systems) are all essential. 
However, simultaneous implementation of all these technologies is rarely feasible.  
 
To help prioritize implementation, the SJCHS IV infusion safety team established multiple 
criteria for the assessment of available technologies:
4 
 
•  Comparative speed to impact (cost and return on investment, staff resources required, time 
required for implementation, and potential to reduce harm).  
•  Impact on quality of care. 
•  Impact on nursing satisfaction and productivity. 
•  Continuous quality improvement (CQI) data capabilities.  
•  A platform that would allow future integration with other technologies.  
 
SJCHS’s IV Infusion Safety Initiative led to hospital-wide implementation of a modular IV 
infusion safety system that incorporated various modules as they became available, i.e., point-of-
care units (the programming “brains” with dose-error-reduction software [DERS]), large-volume 
syringe and PCA pump modules, and continuous respiratory monitoring modules.
4, 10  
 
In this article, we describe the need to improve IV infusion medication safety at the point of care, 
our culture of safety and team approach, and the IV infusion safety system’s core capabilities to 
help avert errors, monitor patient respiratory response, and provide actionable data. In sharing 
our experience, results, and lessons learned, we hope this information will be helpful to other 
 
2health care professionals in prioritizing implementation of IV infusion safety systems as they 
work to improve safety and quality of care for all patients.  
 
Need for Improved IV Medication Safety at the Point of Care 
Medication administration. In the medication use process, the nurse at the bedside is most 
vulnerable to errors.
2 Compared with other steps in the process, the administration stage has the 
fewest safeguards and the fewest support mechanisms.
4, 11, 12, 13, 14 Leape, et al., showed that
38 percent of medication errors causing preventable ADEs occurred during administration, and 
only 2 percent of these errors were intercepted.
 
                                                
15 Errors with the potential to harm patients are 
considered potential ADEs. Of the nonintercepted potential ADEs and preventable ADEs, 
51 percent occurred during the administration stage.
15 Because administration occurs at the end 
of the medication use process, with no naturally occurring redundancies, opportunities to 
intercept errors at this stage are lessened. Critical care studies in high-alert IV medication 
administration found error rates of 34 percent
14, 16 and 49 percent.
14, 
17 
 
IV infusion medications. Only a few high-risk medications—such as warfarin, some forms of 
chemotherapy, and some sedatives—are administered orally. A far greater number can be 
delivered intravenously, e.g., heparin, insulin, morphine, fentanyl, propofol, and midazolam.
4 IV 
medications have been associated with 56 percent of medication errors
18 and 54 percent of 
potential ADEs.
19 Data from a major teaching hospital indicate that overall, 61 percent of the 
most serious and life-threatening potential ADEs are IV drug-related.
a  
 
General-purpose infusion devices can deliver IV medications at any rate within a 10,000-fold 
range (0.1 - 999 mL/hr) and can be programmed for any patient weighing from 600 g to more 
than 300 kg.
4 Without programming safeguards, it is relatively easy to inadvertently deliver a 
comparatively massive overdose. For example, a missing decimal point or a double key press can 
result in a 10- or 100-fold overdose (e.g., by programming 64, 604 or 66.4 instead of 6.4). A 
clinician can easily confuse dose, flow rate, and bolus or loading-dose amounts. A 24-hour dose 
can be programmed to be delivered over 1 hour.
4 
 
Undesirable variability in IV medication practices further increases the risk of harm. A review of 
infusion safety system software datasets from more than 100 individual hospitals revealed huge 
variability in drug names, concentrations, dosing units, dose limits, maximum infusion rates, 
weight limits, volume limits, and other variables.
20 For example, in programming an infusion of 
magnesium sulfate, a clinician had to choose from among 10 different dosing units: grams/hr, 
grams/kg/hr, grams/min, mg/hr, mg/kg/hr, mg/min, mcg/kg/hr, mcg/min, mEq/hr, or 
mEq/kg/hr.
20 Selecting a wrong dosing unit can be tragic. For a 73-kg patient, inadvertently 
using weight-based mcg/kg/min instead of mcg/min would deliver a 73-fold overdose.  
 
Thousands of medications are currently available, and more are being introduced every year. 
Look-alike and work-alike drugs and drugs with sound-alike names all increase the possibility of 
error. The increasing complexity of the patient care environment, the high turnover rates among 
 
a Personal communication, D.W. Bates, MD, MSc, Brigham & Women's Hospital, Boston, MA, October 2001. 
 
3nursing staff, and nurses working in multiple settings further increase the risk of harmful 
medication errors.  
 
IV medication infusion errors are widespread. Aggregated data from IV safety systems in 18 
hospitals documented that 1.1 potentially life-threatening IV medication programming errors and 
an additional 1.5 potentially significant IV medication programming errors were averted for 
every 1,000 patient days.
21 While not every potential ADE results in patient injury, compared 
with other medication errors, IV infusion programming errors have a greater likelihood of 
causing injury. Once a nurse presses “Start” on an infusion device, unless a programming error 
can be intercepted automatically, the misprogrammed infusion will be delivered to the patient. 
An ADE is especially likely to result with drugs, such as heparin, for which dosing errors have a 
low detectability.
22 For acutely ill patients, even a minor over- or underdose can result in serious 
adverse events.
4 
 
Patient Controlled Analgesia  
Despite the effectiveness of PCA for opioid administration, responses to opioids vary greatly 
among individuals, and significant hazards are associated with PCA therapy.
10 Even correctly 
programmed, appropriate doses of opiates can suppress respiration and decrease heart rate and 
blood pressure.
10, 23, 24, 25 Episodes of bradypnea and desaturation can escalate to respiratory 
depression (RD) requiring rescue. The success rate for in-hospital cardiopulmonary resuscitation 
remains less than one in five patients.
26, 27, 28 If detected early, most cases of opioid-induced 
respiratory depression can be treated with naloxone. However, severe cases can be fatal.
29 The 
risk of patient harm due to medication errors with PCA pumps is 3.5-times the risk from any 
other type of medication administration error.
30  
 
A recent study of continuous respiratory monitoring found an incidence of RD based on 
desaturation consistent with previous estimates. However, the incidence of bradypnea was many 
orders of magnitude greater than the 1 to 2 percent widely reported in the literature.
26 Thus, 
respiratory monitoring is a critically important element of PCA pain management. Capnographic 
monitoring—measurements of ventilation using respiration and exhaled carbon dioxide 
(EtCO2)—is particularly important because it can provide an earlier warning of respiratory 
depression than pulse oximetry (SpO2) in some patient populations.
  
 
The Institute for Safe Medication Practices (ISMP) recommends that technology for PCA be 
developed that can alert clinicians to unsafe dose settings, programming errors, and RD.
31 The 
APSF urges health care professionals to consider the potential safety value of continuous 
oxygenation and ventilation monitoring in these patients and implementation of “smart” PCA 
pumps containing dose-error reduction software (DERS).
9 
 
The IV Infusion Safety Initiative at St. Joseph’s/Candler 
Health System 
SJCHS, a “magnet” system comprising two tertiary-care hospitals with 644 beds and 291,504 
discharges annually, has long had a highly collaborative, nonpunitive culture with a strong focus 
on patient and medication safety. In 2000, an ISMP article detailing the hazards associated with 
PCA
32 prompted our multidisciplinary medication error team to focus intently on IV medication 
 
4errors. Recognizing that not all medication errors have the same potential to cause serious 
adverse events, the team decided that first priority should be given to averting errors that pose 
the greatest risk of harm.  
 
In 2001, completion of an ISMP Medication Safety Self-Assessment
33 led the team to focus on 
administration and IV medications. The team established the following Infusion Safety Goals
4:  
 
•  Increase detection/prevention of IV medication administration errors, resulting in improved 
patient care and decreased mortality/morbidity. 
•  Increase documentation of detected/prevented errors, specifically, types of errors; 
where/when errors were occurring; and identification of error-prone drugs. 
•  Implement an error-detection system with built-in feedback loops, so that continuous quality 
improvements (CQI) could be made over time. 
•  Decrease complexity of infusion technology. 
 
IV Infusion Safety Technology 
In the past, it has been difficult to use technology to help avert IV infusion pump programming 
errors. CPOE systems do not address this type of error,
4 and bedside barcode scanning alone is 
not sufficient.
34 Unless infusion and barcode technologies are fully integrated, accurate device 
programming cannot be confirmed. For a continuous IV infusion that spans multiple nursing 
shifts, several clinicians might make periodic dosage adjustments based on laboratory results, 
protocols, or verbal orders that might not be included in the barcode system, which increases the 
possibility of programming errors.
35  
 
Computerized IV infusion safety systems (“smart pumps”) are specifically designed to avert IV 
infusion programming errors and provide actionable data on various aspects of the averted errors. 
For these reasons, in 2002, the SJCHS multidisciplinary team identified implementation of an IV 
infusion safety system as the best initial approach to safeguard patients against high-risk 
medication errors.
4 
 
After comparing and evaluating all “smart” infusion devices on the market at the time and 
reviewing published reports, we selected a modular, computerized, integrated IV infusion system 
with medication-error prevention and CQI data-collection software (Alaris System with 
Guardrails
® Suite of Safety Software, Cardinal Health, Alaris Products, San Diego, CA). Nurses 
involved in reviewing the IV medication safety system actively expressed their support for its 
selection. The system’s unique modular design provides a technology platform that can include 
large-volume syringe and PCA pumps, as well as pulse oximetry and noninvasive capnography 
modules for continuous respiratory monitoring of patients receiving PCA therapy.  
 
Having a single interface for all modules simplifies staff training, reduces programming 
complexity, and increases ease of use.
 This combination of features suggested a dramatically 
improved infusion system that promised a potentially significant reduction in infusion-related 
medication errors.
4, 10 
 
 
5Based on our institution’s best practice guidelines, a review of the literature, and input from key 
physicians and nursing staff, we customized the DERS database to create drug libraries for 
different patient care areas. The database standardizes concentrations, dosing units, and dosing 
limits for IV infusion medications, which also improves safety and efficiency. The medication-
use profiles, known as “drug libraries,” standardize how the device is used in different types of 
patients. CQI data logs provide detailed information, including data on “alerts” (indicating that a 
dosing limit has been exceeded) and averted errors (an alert resulting in reprogramming or 
canceling the infusion). Data analysis helps identify opportunities for improving IV medication 
safety and best practices.
4  
 
Nurse education. Following selection of the system, clinical experts from various patient care 
areas were designated as trainers. In a multitiered process, staff received training through expert 
sessions, skills labs, hands-on exposure, and an internet computer-based training module 
provided by the vendor. As a result, nurses, pharmacists, and physicians realized the benefits of 
using the safety software to help prevent high-risk IV medication errors.
4 
 
Installation. In October 2002, the new infusion system was installed on all units in our three-
hospital health care system. Installation of 584 point-of-care units and 760 large-volume pump 
modules was completed within an 8-hour period. Hospital-wide implementation required no 
changes in nursing workflow, had minimal impact on productivity, and required no additional 
full-time employees (FTEs).
4, 8 CQI logs documented immediate impact on prevention of IV 
programming errors (Table 1). Syringe pumps were added to the system in 2003. 
 
Analysis of Prevented ADEs and Associated Harm  
In July 2003, an innovative harm-assessment tool was developed by the IV Medication Harm 
Index Study Group, which included physicians, pharmacists, and nurses, who are recognized 
patient safety experts. The index comprised three subscales: (1) the inherent risk of the drug 
being infused, (2) the risk associated with patient acuity, and (3) the risk that an infusion-related 
ADE might go undetected. Totaled subscale scores ranged from 3.5 to 14; higher scores 
indicated greater harm/risk.
22 Use of this innovative tool allowed us to assess the extent of harm 
averted by the system. 
 
Wireless Networking, Expanded Drug Libraries 
In 2004, further safety improvements were achieved with expanded drug libraries and the 
implementation of wireless networking with system management capabilities. Wireless 
networking allows pharmacy to remotely monitor any patient receiving an infusion outside pre-
established limits and to quickly install software upgrades, revise best-practice datasets, and 
gather CQI data for analysis.  
 
PCA with Continuous Respiratory Monitoring 
In 2004, PCA, capnography (EtCO2) and pulse oximetry (SpO2) modules (Alaris System with 
Guardrails
® Suite of Safety Software, Cardinal Health, Alaris Products, San Diego, CA with 
Oridion Microstream
® capnography technology and Nellcor
® OxiMax
® pulse oximetry 
technology) became available and were added to the IV infusion safety system to monitor 
 
 
6Table 1.  Examples of averted programming errors
a 
Location Drug  Variable  Initial  Reprogrammed 
Medical-surgical  Hydromorphone  PCA dose  3 mg  Decreased to 1 mg 
Medical-surgical  Hydromorphone  Maximum limit  25 mg  Decreased to 10 mg 
Medical-surgical Hydromorphone Continuous dose  30 mg  Decreased to 1 mg 
Medical-surgical  Morphine  Loading dose  10 mg  Decreased to 4 mg 
Critical care  Fentanyl  Continuous dose  300 μg  Decreased to 150 μg 
Medical-surgical  Hydromorphone  Maximum limit  200 mg  Decreased to 10 mg 
Medical-surgical Fentanyl  PCA  dose  1  μg  Increased to 50 μg 
Critical care  Morphine  Lockout (time)  30 min  Increased to 15 min 
Critical care  Meperidine  Continuous dose  20 mg  Decreased to 10 mg 
a  Alerts are not posted until the “start” key is pressed and programming is completed. All limits are initially set up as “soft” (can 
be administered as override). 
Source: Maddox RR, Williams CK, Oglesby H, et al. Am J Health-Syst Pharm 2006;; 63: 157-64  Reprinted with permission. 
 
nonintubated patients receiving PCA therapy in critical care units and in general nursing units. 
The monitors provided PCA/EtCO2 and PCA/SpO2 trending data at the bedside to assist 
clinicians in assessing respiratory response to PCA therapy. The system was designed to 
supplement, but not substitute for, clinician monitoring. The combination of system components 
allowed monitoring of practice (i.e., infusion programming) and patients (i.e., individual 
respiratory responses to opioids).  
 
As an initial beta site, SJCHS evaluated the new PCA and respiratory monitoring modules for  
6 months. Based on this evaluation, continuous respiratory monitoring of each PCA patient was 
made the standard of care. PCA and respiratory monitoring modules were implemented hospital 
wide in June 2004.
 Pharmacy and nursing originally had planned to purchase a pulse oximetry 
module for each PCA module. However, beta-testing results underscored the difficulty of 
predicting patient response to opioids and showed capnography to be the “first indicator” of 
opioid-related respiratory depression. As a result, a capnography module was purchased for each 
PCA module, and pulse oximetry modules for use with selected patients.
11  
 
Respiratory Therapist’s Expanded Role 
Hospital PCA policy was revised to require respiratory therapy to round on every PCA patient at 
least once per 12-hour shift. When continuous capnography is being used with a patient, if an 
issue arises and a nurse cannot resolve the alarm situation, respiratory therapy functions as the 
“first responder” for patients at risk of respiratory depression. The respiratory therapist assesses 
the patient, reviews the patient’s trended capnography data and the amount and type of 
medication the patient has received, and assists the nurse in finding the cause of the patient’s 
change in status, determining the appropriate intervention, and working with the physician.  
 
 
7Respiratory therapy also developed a patient selection algorithm to help clinicians determine 
appropriate respiratory monitoring for patients.  
 
Patient Selection 
All SJCHS patients who receive PCA therapy have EtCO2 monitoring to help protect against 
narcotic-induced respiratory depression. In addition, all patients are intermittently monitored for 
SpO2. Patients with the following conditions are continuously monitored for SpO2: patients at 
risk of pulmonary embolism, CO2 retainers, initial SpO2 ≤ 92 percent, and congestive heart 
failure. In addition, SpO2 may be initiated “as needed” anytime that nursing or respiratory 
therapy deems it necessary.
11  
 
Results 
Implementation of a modular, IV infusion safety system for large-volume, syringe, and PCA 
pumps and continuous respiratory monitoring achieved the SJCHS Infusion Safety Initiative 
Goals established in 2000. Representative results include the following:
4, 8, 11, 23 
 
IV Infusion Safety  
 
•  The number of different types of infusion devices at SJCHS was reduced from five to one, 
increasing standardization and decreasing opportunities for error. 
•  Standardization of decision-support drug libraries, including drug names, concentrations 
dosing units, and dosing limits across the two hospitals, as well as decreased complexity and 
opportunities for error. 
•  Failure modes and effects analyses (FMEA) showed a 73 percent reduction, from 210 to 56, 
in risk priority score for IV heparin therapy.  
•  Direct observation showed greater than 98 percent nurse compliance with the use of safety 
software that provides warnings based on the decision-support library.  
•  From October 2002 to July 2003, CQI data documented 245 averted errors, including 166 
averted overdoses.  
•  Application of the IV Medication Harm Index identified 33 of these 166 as highest risk 
averted overdoses—e.g., IV heparin at 13 times the intended dose. 
•  Heparin and propofol accounted for 73 percent of the highest risk averted overdoses. 
•  Even though 78 percent of large-volume modules were used with critical care patient types, 
52 percent of highest risk averted overdoses occurred with non-critical care patient types.  
•  From January to June 2006, CQI data from 558 expanded IV safety systems documented 967 
averted errors (Figure 1). 
•  Of these, 328 were averted overdoses greater than 1.5 times the maximum dose and likely to 
cause harm.  
•  IV Medication Harm Index of data from January to December 2006 identified 90 highest 
risk-averted overdoses. 
 
 
8Nursing 
Satisfaction 
Medication Management 
Readiness Team analysis 
and informal interviews 
showed that the nursing 
staff has embraced the new 
system. We feel that 
implementation of this 
innovative system 
demonstrates the hospital’s 
commitment to nurses and 
gives SJCHS an edge in 
nursing retention and 
recruitment by placing practice safety at the forefront.
4 
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Figure 1. Number of programming errors prevented by smart pump alert:  
January – June 2006. 
 
PCA Safety
11 
•  CQI data indicate significant patient harm has been averted from inadvertent 
misprogramming of PCA devices by nurses. During the initial 4 months, with PCA syringes 
initiated for 225 patients, the system averted 52 PCA programming errors.  
•  During the first months of use, continuous respiratory monitoring helped clinicians identify 
numerous cases requiring intervention, even when programming was correct, and a patient 
received therapeutic dosing.  
o  Multiple cases of undiagnosed obstructive sleep apnea (OSA) and pulmonary embolism 
have been identified before undue clinical outcomes occurred. 
o  In the 33 months from July 2004 through March 2007, 16 patients with declining 
physiologic status were identified by continuous respiratory monitoring and avoided 
unwarranted outcomes and possible transfer to the intensive care unit (ICU).
 This value is 
the number of instances for which there are documented case reports. There were other 
instances in which RR alarms were triggered, interventions made, and unwarranted 
outcomes averted. However, no case reports were submitted.  
 
Nursing Satisfaction 
Subjective feedback from SJCHS nursing staff indicates that nurses feel more comfortable in 
aggressively managing patients’ pain and are less reluctant to give additional medication now 
that they have information to help them ensure “right programming, right response.” This is 
particularly important with sickle cell patients, who often require high doses of opioids. 
Knowing that patients will be more comfortable, have more energy, and do better increases 
nursing satisfaction. In addition, the common user interface for PCA and monitoring modules 
reduces training time and decreases the likelihood of error. Clinician assessments of patients 
receiving PCA therapy have been greatly enhanced by the availability of combined dosing and 
respiratory monitoring trend data, particularly for EtCO2. In some cases, capnographic data 
provided the only indication of respiratory depression.
11  
 
9 
Financial Benefits 
From January to June 2006, 558 expanded infusion safety systems recorded 328 overdoses 
greater than 1.5 times the maximum dose and likely to cause harm. Using the conservative 
AHRQ value of $6,000 for costs of a medication-related adverse event/poisoning, which includes 
accidental drug overdose, these overdoses would have been associated with 6-month costs of 
$1,968,000, had they occurred. ADEs are also costly—in 2006 dollars, $8,750 per preventable 
ADE.
2, 3 This supports the decade-old contention that interventions that reduce the frequency of 
ADEs can be justified both economically and to improve the quality of care.
36  
 
Discussion 
Practice improvements based on analysis of CQI data from the IV infusion safety software 
include the following: 
 
•  IV drug labels were reformulated to include total volume and amount of drug, allowing 
nursing staff to program the system to deliver the correct dose of medication more easily.
4 
•  For neonatal and pediatric patients, the efficiency and safety of IV medication administration 
for infrequently used drugs were increased, since clinicians can quickly reference the drug 
database programmed in the pump’s drug library at the bedside, knowing that information is 
adequately backed by the current literature.
4 
•  Propofol and heparin were associated with the greatest number of safety software alerts, 
which allowed staff to better focus process improvement efforts.
22 
•  The SJCHS heparin protocol was revised to eliminate at least three steps, multiple 
calculations, and multiple opportunities for error, thus improving safety and timeliness of 
heparin administration.
4 
•  Unique bolus dosing parameters were developed for propofol, and an ICU sedation protocol 
was implemented that requires sedative dosing using targeted goals according to a predefined 
objective consistent with the Society of Critical Care Medicine Good Clinical Practice 
guidelines.
35 
o  Propofol dosing alerts were reduced by more than 50 percent. 
o  Bolus doses of propofol were almost eliminated.  
o  The total cost of propofol was reduced to $650,330 from $1,774,395.  
•  Creation of a respiratory monitoring algorithm increased ease of patient selection for EtCO2 
and/or SpO2 monitoring.
11 
 
SJCHS’s IV Infusion Safety Initiative has taught us the importance of giving focused attention to 
the following issues in order to effect a successful multifaceted collaborative effort: 
 
Multidisciplinary team approach. A collaborative approach is key to improving patient and 
medication safety. Involving a multidisciplinary team to research technology alternatives was an 
effective way to “make our case” to our health care system leadership. The team conducted 
comprehensive analyses, from the information-gathering stage through final price negotiations. 
While time-consuming, this approach was well worth the effort and was effective in obtaining 
 
10leadership approval of “smart pump” technology. Involvement of nursing in research and 
implementation of the technology resulted in a high level of nursing acceptance and compliance. 
 
Focus on highest risk errors. Identifying and averting errors that have the highest risk—i.e., IV 
administration errors—have an immediate impact on reducing patient harm. “Speed-to-impact” 
analysis can help to prioritize selection of medication safety technologies. Implementation of IV 
infusion safety systems has immediate, measurable impact on helping avert high-risk medication 
errors. Implementation also results in practice improvements, increased interdisciplinary 
communication, and improved nursing satisfaction, retention, and recruitment.  
 
Continuous respiratory monitoring of PCA therapy. When PCA pumps are involved, the risk 
of harm is more than 3.5 times as great as it is with large-volume pumps.
30 However, PCA 
programming errors are not the only cause of oversedation. For this reason, the use of respiratory 
monitoring, especially capnometry, is important for patients receiving PCA therapy. Continuous 
SpO2 and EtCO2 are important clinical parameters and should be used in conjunction with each 
other. SpO2 reflects oxygenation, while EtCO2 reflects ventilation; one may be normal while the 
other demonstrates an abnormal respiratory status. Noncritical care nurses and physicians are 
generally unfamiliar with the information provided by these devices and might have problems 
applying the data to the care of the patient. Because of this unfamiliarity, nurses are sometimes 
reluctant to call physicians when the system alarms. Respiratory therapists may be needed to 
interpret the data.
11 
 
Ongoing analysis of CQI data. Analysis of CQI data is useful to identify opportunities for 
practice improvements and to target medication safety efforts. Importantly, the software in the 
IV safety system provides not only interdiction of untoward events but also information. 
Analyzing the CQI data from all devices allows the multidisciplinary team to identify further 
opportunities for best practice improvements. Wireless networking and multidisciplinary 
collaboration allow implementation of those improvements efficiently and effectively, providing 
continuous safety improvement for patients and clinicians. 
 
Conclusion 
SJCHS’s experience shows that a modular IV infusion safety system offers a highly effective 
safety net for detecting IV medication errors and monitoring patient respiratory responses. The 
harm and costs averted using this technology are substantial. There is little doubt that morbidity 
and mortality have been reduced because of the investment in this system.  
 
Patients not in critical care units are usually more hemodynamically stable, receive fewer IV 
infusions, and are typically perceived to be at lower risk of infusion-related errors. Findings from 
the IV Medication Harm Index challenge this perception, particularly when anticoagulants, such 
as heparin are being infused. Data analysis showing that more than half of the most serious 
averted errors were associated with patients outside the ICU supports the importance of using IV 
safety systems for critical care and non-critical care patients.
22 
 
The results of using these technologies have convinced us that respiratory monitoring with PCA 
must be the standard of care within SJCHS. This system demonstrated immediate improvement 
 
11in the care of patients receiving PCA, as evidenced by multiple cases during the first months of 
use. Pulse oximetry and capnography with PCA prevented potential harm in these labile patients, 
decreasing the need to admit or transfer them to higher acuity departments, such as a step-down 
unit or ICU.
 
 
The achievements of the SJCHS Infusion Safety Initiative have further strengthened our culture 
of safety and confirmed the importance of multidisciplinary collaboration. Infusion safety 
technology now helps clinicians identify and, most importantly, avert the medication errors 
associated with the greatest risk of harm—IV administration errors at the point of care. Using 
wireless technology, staff can remotely monitor all infusions in both hospitals. Trend data from 
respiratory monitors can be used to help avert PCA programming errors and monitor patient 
responses to opioids.  
 
Benefits of “smart” infusion technology include a safe work environment for nurses; 
standardization of IV medication concentrations, dosing units and dosing limits; improved safety 
by avoiding high-risk IV medication administration errors; improved patient satisfaction and 
safety perception; and improved financial performance through avoiding these costly errors. IV 
infusion safety system implementation provides a rapid, effective, and cost-effective means to 
improve patient safety and quality of care.  
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